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INTRODUCTION BY SUSAN EISENHOWER

SPEECH FOR THE 2008 NATIONAL SPACE FORUM
Senator Wayne Allard

Senator Wayne Allard is from the State of Colorado

Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here with all of
you today at the National Space Forum, and it is an
honor to be here with so many industry experts and
leaders. I thank our sponsors, the Eisenhower Center
for Space and Defense Studies at the U.S. Air Force
Academy and also the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, for hosting this important event
and for giving me an opportunity to speak to you
today. In the Senate I have long supported the Center
for Space and Defense Studies, and I am pleased to
see the Center executing its goals of supporting and
fostering a national dialogue on space.
As a member of the Senate Appropriations and
Budget Committees, a former member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, co-chairman of the
Congressional Space Power Caucus, and member of
the Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, I am
extremely interested in the topic of this forum: the
space policy challenges facing the new presidential
administration.
Unquestionably, 2008 is shaping to be a landmark
year in American history as we will be electing a
president in the first true open-seat election in 80
years, as no incumbent candidate is running in the
primaries. Certainly much has changed since then. In
1928 space travel and space exploration existed in
imaginations, and was only conceptualized in the
minds and drawing boards of the world’s greatest
scientists who could only hope man would possess
the ability to reach outer space within their lifetimes.
It would have been very difficult to conceive that just
three decades later man would reach space, and 11
years after that monumental achievement, we would
be walking on the moon and repairing orbital
structures in space.

As Americans, we are now able to both celebrate our
rich and storied history with space, while looking
forward to what achievements lay ahead. Just last
week the United States celebrated the 50th
anniversary of Explorer 1, the first U.S. satellite to
orbit Earth and today marks the 50th anniversary of
the creation of the Advanced Research Projects
Agency in response to Sputnik. NASA is also
commemorating its golden anniversary this year. The
first 50 years in space have yielded incredible results
and discoveries that have shaped the world we live in
today. Strategically, though, we have reached a
crossroads; we have proven we can get there, and
must now decide what we want to do, now that we’re
there.
While politically 2008 may be remembered as a year
for the ages, 2009 will quickly usher in many difficult
and daunting challenges for a new administration and
our 44th president. Washington always has and
always will play a game of competing priorities, and
for space it will be no different. The administration
will be forced to choose and determine where, and in
what capacity, it wants to prioritize space, including
NASA, the Department of Defense’s numerous
agencies and the regulation of commercial space. In a
broad sense, space will be forced to compete for
limited dollars with the numerous programs,
departments and agencies supported by our
government. Money will be used to equip and support
our troops, as well as to meet the needs of veterans.
Domestic priories such as healthcare and social
security are sure to require much attention, as will our
evolving energy needs and of course the state of the
economy is sure to factor in heavily as well.
After sifting though these many and sometimes
conflicting priorities, the next President will face a

host of policy decisions within the numerous areas of
space, including: retirement of the Space Shuttle and
making operational the next general human
spaceflight vehicles; joint civil and military Earth
observation capabilities; replacement of national
security space assets and next generation blocks; and
government utilization of commercial remote sensing
capabilities for geo-spatial intelligence needs.
To further complicate this task, these decisions and
activities will not be made in isolation, as space
activities have increased globally, with more nations
seeking to gain strategic and economic advantages
through the use of space. It is no longer just the U.S.
and Russia in space. Globalization now reaches
beyond the globe itself. New partners, like India, are
seeking to send spacecraft to the Moon. And
uncertainty around utilization of the assembled
Internal Space Station means opportunities and the
necessity for international cooperation in civil space
will continue to expand dramatically.
America’s accomplishments in space have been
numerous and influential. I’m positive you all could
recite dozens of examples of products and services we
all use everyday that were created through our space
programs that enhance our quality of life: ATM
machines, GPS technology, enriched baby food, and
athletic shoes are just a few of the thousands of
products that exist. Despite all this success, the space
industry and space agencies will have to continue to
prove their worth and validate their usefulness to a
new Administration in order to receive federal
dollars. Our space programs and the commercial
space industry have both developed though
innovation and competition - these challenges are
nothing new. Whether policy makers like it or not,
space can’t be ignored and will continue to evolve to
become even more intertwined within our daily lives.
Through the years, space has continued to provide a
distinct and unquestioned strategic advantage in
ensuring our national security. Today’s world is no
exception, and our military depends on space more
than ever. Space assets are used for targeting,
communications, weather, intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance, navigation and numerous other
functions. There is no doubt the military space
domain is here to stay, the only question remains is
how a new Administration will best utilize this
platform.
From a policy perspective, a number of choices exist.
How, and in what ways should we expand our space
assets and to what degree are we willing to become
even more dependent upon them for national
security? In turn, to what degree do we need to
protect our assets, and how significantly are they at
risk? How will we apply existing, and perhaps
outdated, space polices to this new world with real
threats to our space domination? I agree with
STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton that
the space domain needs a bit of an image change. We
can’t simply think of space as just an enabler for other
domains, and we need to transition our thinking and
protocol to allow our land, sea, and air components to
adequately and effectively support our space assets as
well. The new administration will have to choose how
it will incorporate and integrate space more
completely into the big picture of national security.
Further, I believe we are already overdue in
determining and defining our comprehensive policy
related to our strategic space assets. Existing policy
states that other nations have the right to use space for
peaceful purposes and also have the right to defend
their interests. However, we lack clarity as to what
enforcement mechanisms exist for the U.S., and to
what extent we will go to defend our space interests.
There is no definitive line-in-the-sand, no borders in
this ever-changing world of competing space
interests. Our overall national policies must be
adjusted in order to be prepared for any threat that
may exist.
As we all remember, the Chinese ASAT test
collectively woke up the world and reminded us that
we are not alone in space; it is not our playground and
not solely our domain. Further, it proved that China
has an intense interest in developing space
capabilities. Major policy choices and decisions need
to be made in order to counter and prepare for any

challenge to our space dominance. This is
increasingly imperative as we become more
dependent on our space assets as this increased
reliance makes our satellites and other assets more
appealing targets for potential enemies. These
decisions must be made in conjunction with an
increased integration of space assets into all defensewide operations in order for the U.S. to meet our full
potential and integrate into a unified network.
Technology is advancing so quickly that our policies
are failing to keep up, and new space integration
doctrine must be created that standardize tactics and
procedures. We cannot afford to stovepipe our
capabilities.
This year already, the issue of space weaponry has
made headlines. It has been reported that China and
Russia are planning to introduce next week a draft
treaty for the “Prevention of Placement of Weapons
in Outer Space” at the International Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva. In response, it is my
understanding that U.S officials have announced their
opposition to this treaty. This topic is certainly not
going away, and has long-reaching political
consequences. Likely, this will become an
increasingly more influential political issue in coming
years, and the next administration will need to
develop policy specifically related to weapon
proliferation in space as part of their comprehensive
foreign policy strategy. As such, I predict that an
unprecedented, concrete international agreement will
be forged regarding the issue of weapons in space
because the eventual prevalence of the issue and the
attention it acquires world-wide. Further, I believe
this will be sought with controversy and conflicting
self-interests due to the parties involved, and it is my
hope the U.S. does not compromise any of our self
interests in such negotiations.
The next administration will also be confronted with
the need to further incorporate and integrate cyber
defense systems into our military. The Air Force has
already stood up a provisional Cyber Command, and
I’ve strongly advocated for its basing to be located in
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Air Force Cyber
Command will ensure the freedom from attack in the

cyberspace domain. This decade has already seen
several attacks on our cyber infrastructure by China.
In May 2001 Chinese hackers successful took down
the White House Web site for almost three hours. The
effects of a cyber attack can be crippling. Last year,
Estonia witnessed first-hand the effects of a
successful large-scale attack when a coordinated
Russian attack disabled many commercial and
governmental websites in the nation for several days.
The cyber threat is real, and can amount to much
more than a mere inconvenience. Its scope stretches
far beyond the “white-collar warriors” who attack
from behind their monitors. A successful attack is the
equivalent of modern-day industrial sabotage. On the
battlefield, our military uses cyber tools to disable and
destroy remotely triggered IEDs in Iraq, conduct
electronic warfare operations, halt terrorist use of
GPS and satellite communications, and prevent
jamming of frequencies. Disruption of these abilities
can be deadly; these are not threats we can afford to
take lightly. The next administration will have to
determine to what degree we will incorporate
cyberspace and how will that relate to our overall
space goals. Further integration of many systems
including the broader domains of space and
cyberspace will be a daunting task, and could make
the monumental Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 look
like a simple piece of legislation.
In addition to the formal integration of these new
platforms, the next administration will be confronted
with the proverbial fork-in-the-road regarding missile
defense. The Bush administration has been a strong
advocate for the program and has significantly
restructured our missile defense assets. The Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) has received strong bipartisan support in Congress. The FY 2008 budget
cycle, however, was not so kind. Last year, one of
MDA’s top priorities, the placement of proposed
missile defense installations in Europe, was funded
$85 million below the budget request, and the project
garnered headlines world-wide and triggered strong
opposition from Russia.

Other important MDA programs also received
decreased funding last year, including the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) sensor
development project, which is critical to increasing
our ability to actively monitor threats around the
globe. STSS provides worldwide tracking,
discrimination and fire control. This program was
funded at about one-third less than the President’s
request. STSS has grown in cost, but remains
essential to our ability to effectively monitor future
threats. Additionally, other programs such as the
Multiple Kill vehicle and the Airborne Laser are also
crucial to developing a stronger and more
sophisticated missile defense system.

As you know, our system today consists of spacebased detection sensors, ground-based and seaborne
early warning and tracking sensors, ground-based
interceptors in Alaska and California for long-range
defense, transportable ground-based Patriot
capability, and sea-based interceptors to engage short
and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our system
features multiple defensive layers with system
elements working together synergistically to enhance
the capability as a whole. As advanced as our system
is, it is far from invincible as we are still very much
tethered to the ground and sea.
The new administration and Congress needs to
determine what degree of investment it wants to place
in future development. What we lack right now is a
specific program that would develop a space layer of
interceptors. I would like to see this administration, as
well as the next begin to develop such a layer.
Unquestionably, this would translate into an
incredible strategic advantage.

Aside from cuts to these big-name projects, I was also
disappointed in proposed Congressional funding cuts
for education and development centers. The Missile
Defense Space Experimentation Center located at
Shriever Air Force Base is critical to develop our
future space-based capabilities, and the advancements
made there contribute directly to the success of such
programs like STSS. I was able to work with my
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee,
Senators Inouye and Stevens, to keep the full
requests, but the support was not automatic and does
not bode well for the future of the program under a
less enthusiastically supportive Administration.

A layer of space-based interceptors would enable a
global on-call missile defense capability that could
produce a timely response to rapidly evolving
situations, and would enable the U.S. to be prepared
for all types of threats that could develop out of
unpredictable locations.

In FY ’08 Congress prioritized systems that are ready
or nearing completion for deployment as opposed to
more futuristic systems, and it will be intriguing to
see what pattern develops entering the new
administration. It is of great concern to me if the
priorities reflected in FY 2008 continue to veer even
farther away from long-term development. It is
import for us to keep U.S. industries active in the
program and include our allies like Japan, with whom
we are cooperating to build an ICBM interceptor that
could be deployed from an Aegis cruiser. In the longterm, the MDA’s goal is to build a global system,
which is equipped to meet an unpredictable global
threat. As such, space is paramount to accomplishing
this goal.

Of course such capabilities are accompanied with a
high price-tag, and must compete with other priorities
within the defense budget as well as the national
budget in a hotly contested political environment.
Even so, it is important to remember that such
developments would not exist in a vacuum, but would
be part of a complex and integrated system. The next
administration will have to choose which direction to
take, and which way it wants to go: continue the trend
demonstrated in the 110th Congress of prioritizing
near term projects at the expense of future projects or
invest in comprehensive long-term goals such as
space-based interceptors that would be able to reach
targets more rapidly and are capable of destroying
enemy missiles in the boost phase.

Most certainly the cost of a ballistic missile nuclear
strike against a U.S. city would be enormous; the
economic toll alone is estimated to be $4 trillion.
There would be no conceivable way to calculate or
compensate for the loss of life and moral. The next
president must determine these priories, assess our
enemies’ capably and make the best decision. After
60 years of developing missile defense technology,
we have reached the point were we must choose a
direction.
It is my prediction that within the next
Administration, missile defense will become a much
less polarizing political issue than it has been in the
past. As counties like China and now Iran, which this
week test-launched the country's first low-orbit
research satellite, begin looking toward space, the
threat to American space dominance will become
more apparent. Despite recent events in China, North
Korea and Iran, skeptics of missile defense continue
to characterize the threat from other nations as
hypothetical and merely an academic exercise
because the U.S. has remained so much farther
advanced than our adversaries. We will be forced to
acknowledge and confront these challenges because
they will be unavoidable. I predict the debate to shift
from “should we” to “how should we best” invest in
missile defense.
Utilizing space for national security comes in many
forms, including data imagery. The next
administration will have to determine the appropriate
role for commercial geo-spatial data providers and the
government. Particularly, the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National
Geospatial Agency (NGA) has expressed concerns
recently about the relationship and reliance upon
commercial-data providers and expressed a need for
more “in house” imagery services. With more
commercial companies emerging with business cases
for entering parts of space that were previously only
in the government domain, the question will
inevitably be raised as to what capabilities are vital,
and what capabilities can be effectively provided by
the private sector. This addresses an inherent and
time-old debate over the usefulness of contractors,

and whether a particular service should be considered
inherently governmental.
President Bush’s Commercial Remote Sensing Policy
from April 2003 states that the fundamental goals
include “relying to the maximum practical extent on
U.S. commercial remote sensing capabilities for
filling imagery and geospatial needs.” However a
recent and influential report released last fall
recommended against the current NGA model of
using multiyear contracts with commercial data
providers to procure imagery and favored a more
traditional business model of government owned and
operated satellites. The administration will be
confronted with the decisions of how to regulate and
manage the relationship between these apparent
conflicting concerns. Industry is naturally concerned
about this potential policy switch, and contends that
if their business with the U.S. Government is greatly
reduced, the market could give rise to foreign
companies filling that void, companies that the U.S.
has no control over, which could produce yet another
security concern.
The incoming administration must pursue policies
that will enable healthy commercial space activities in
all sectors of the industry, while leveraging existing
commercial space capabilities. The United States is
facing unprecedented international competition in this
arena. New competitors have emerged in the space
exploration field. China, India, Japan, Russia and
Europe are all taking a more active and innovative
role in space travel and commercial development. The
X-Prize Foundation recently announced the Google
Lunar X Prize, which invites private teams from
around the world to build a robotic rover capable of
landing on the Moon. Virgin Galactic, based in
California, has plans for SpaceShipTwo, a sixpassenger space liner with suborbital passenger
services in 2008. Over seas, EADS-Astrium is
developing a four-person spacecraft to make
suborbital trips with the possibility of the first
commercial flight in 2012.
The next administration will also have to confront the
reality of an emerging commercial space industry,

which is growing at the same time the government’s
space systems are in transition. By 2010 the Space
Shuttle program will be retired, and it likely will be
three to five years where NASA can not send man
into space; the question remains what will fill that
void? For this reason, it is imperative that the United
States government continue to promote private and
commercial space exploration, developing a vibrant
and ground-breaking commercial sector. The question
will also be raised about the appropriate usage of
government funds, and if the government is financing
projects that duplicate commercial capabilities.
Recent developments in commercial and civil space
exploration, namely Spaceship One, incorporate
innovative technologies, knowledge and existing
infrastructures to explore and support the future
human space exploration. Further collaboration and
communication will be needed to meet the
requirements of future space exploration while
pursuing a cost-effective and sustainable approach.
Taking this new and unique opportunity to further
develop partnerships with the private and commercial
space industry will mean the United States maintains
it competitive and technological advantage.
The administration will also have to formulate its
long-term strategic vision; will it move away from
President Bush’s “vision for space exploration” that
focuses on permanent lunar bases similar to the
International Space Station and a return to the Moon
by 2020 in preparation for eventual human
exploration of Mars and other destinations? Will new
alternatives be proposed and will a strategic shift take
place? The Vision for Space has broad implications
for NASA as almost all the funds are expected to
come from other existing NASA programs. Congress
is still seeking to balance NASA’s exploration
activities and other existing programs like science and
aeronautics research. Congress last authorized NASA
in 2005 for FY 2007 and 2008, so reauthorization of
NASA in FY 2009 and beyond could provide a new
administration the opportunity to shape future polices
considerably. Given the current political situation, it
is entirely possible that Congress will not be able to
provide comprehensive and long-term authorization
this year. That would provide the new administration

with an opportunity to implant a firm footprint on
NASA’s future.
NASA will need to reshape its workforce in order to
better align the mix of skills with the needs for future
missions, and to ensure that NASA will have the
necessary skills to achieve the new vision.
Consequently, NASA sees a need to identify those
skills that will no longer be needed, take steps to
retrain and reshape the workforce, and be able to
provide specific skills that will be needed in the
future.

In conclusion, after 50 years in space we truly have
reached a crossroads and the next president will face
complicated and vital decisions regarding our future
in space. Chiefly, we need to encourage more math
and science students. It is an alarming fact that
universities awarded more than twice the number of
bachelors’ degrees in physics 50 years ago than they
do today. We need to replace retiring space
professionals in reinvigorate the workforce. This, to
some degree is accomplished by forums like we have
today. At its core, space exploration is inspirational.
We strive to inspire the next generation of ambitious
engineers, astronauts and explorers. I truly hope that
more young people will be able to experience and
benefit from space exploration. The Center for Space
and Defense Studies and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies perform a vital role in our
efforts to bring attention back to space, and excite
individuals about what possibilities that exist in the
future. Thank you again for this opportunity.
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SPEECH FOR THE 2008 NATIONAL SPACE FORUM
Representative Terry Everett

Representative Terry Everett is from the Second District of Alabama

I would like to thank the Eisenhower Center for
Space and Defense Studies and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies for the invitation
to speak today. I would also like to thank Dr.
Hamre , Ambassador Harrison, and Peter Teets for
their leadership. Peter Teets is a good friend and
great space leader and I am honored to be among
such individuals who I hold in high regard.
My objective here today is to provide my
thoughts and observations on national security
space issues being discussed in Congress and
prospects for the upcoming budget year. The
specific topics I plan to discuss are:
•
•
•

Understanding our dependence on space;
Space protection and space situational
awareness;
Space acquisition and a few key space
programs.

•

•

Space is also integral to modern day
warfighting. I like to explain to my colleagues that
the F-22, U-A-S, cruiser, or F-C-S system they
support isn’t very effective without space.
•

•
•

The public in general and many members
have no idea how dependant we are on space and
how essential it has become to so many aspects of
our daily lives.
As this forum knows all too well, we have
seen great growth in the commercial and civil uses
of space.
•
•

The global space industry grew to nearly $220
billion last year; an 18-percent annual increase.
Last year, the satellite television industry grew
by 20-percent, GPS equipment by 43-percent,
and satellite radio by 96-percent.

GPS is essential to commercial aviation,
commercial shipping, enhanced 9-1-1
emergency services, in-vehicle navigation,
fleet/vehicle tracking and financial transactions.
Agriculture Uses: GPS and remote sensing is
used to track farm equipment, assess crop
health, and forecast crop production.

•

General Dogden tells the story that when he
asked a soldier if he needs space, the soldier
replied no, All I just need is my weapon and this
black box to tell me where I am and to talk to
my commander.
Tactical SATCOM enables divisions to have
communications over extreme distances.
In Iraq today, U.S. soldiers manning Joint
Security Stations carry satellite maps of local
neighborhoods. MRAPs carry GPS and
SATCOM-enabled blue force tracking systems.
In June 2006, Al Qaida leader al-Zarqawi was
targeted with one F-15 sortie and two 500 pound
bombs. This successful strike mission was
heavily reliant on space, and included: Highresolution satellite imagery and other
intelligence to geo-locate the target within
meters; Satellite communications to the cockpit
for real-time updates; and GPS-guided precision
munitions to minimize collateral damage.
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I believe a greater emphasis must be placed
on space protection and space situational awareness.
I was successful in securing legislation on this
topic. This year’s conference report directs the
Secretary of Defense and DNI to develop a space
protection strategy.
The threat to space is clear and growing. In
particular, I find China’s military modernization in
counterspace quite worrisome. I have not seen a
coherent, comprehensive strategy from the
Department on how it would address these threats.
The legislation asks that the following questions be
considered:
•
•
•

First, what implications do these threats
have on our nation’s future space
architecture and investment strategy?
Second, what material and non-material
solutions are needed?
And third, can improvements be made in
how the defense and intelligence
communities acquire and manage S-S-A
and protection capabilities?

Simply put, it’s impossible to know HOW to
protect our space assets if we don’t know WHAT to
protect, from a global, commercial, and military
standpoint. In this case, I’m speaking about both
black and white space. I’ve tried as Chairman and
now Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee to attract national attention to the
issue of space control. We need more education
and awareness on these issues.
I am concerned about D-O-D budgeting for
S-S-A and protection capabilities. Less than 4percent of the over-all space budget is spent in these
areas -- and that doesn’t include NRO, or, Black
space. Is this enough? I don’t believe it is. Our
ability to take advantage of space is limited by our
modest investments in the protection of our space
assets. In fiscal year 2008, several key initiatives,
such as the Self-Awareness S-S-A system,
RAIDRS, and the Space Fence, ended up on the Air
Force unfunded priority list. In a welcome move, it

appears the FY 2009 budget request increases S-SA and protection resources by about 12-percent.
We have a fragile space architecture at this
moment in time. We have a real opportunity to
look hard at our national architectures, change our
investment strategies, and leverage commercial and
perhaps foreign partner capabilities. I am
concerned that we say we have redundancies and
alternatives, but where are the details?
China’s ASAT test raises some important
policy and operational issues we have yet to work
through. Do we need more emphasis on war games
and exercises? Surely, we need to work through
policy issues and concepts of operations ahead of
time through war games and exercises in realistic
environments.
I’d like to pose some questions to this body
and ask that you give them thought as you continue
your panel discussions:
•

•

•

•

•

As we think about deterrence against 21st
century threats, how do we apply deterrence to
space? Can we deter others from holding our
space systems at risk?
Do we have clear “trip lines” or thresholds for
action? Our current policy is silent on this.
Would a policy that signals our intent and lays
out consequences be more effective?
How would U.S. policymakers respond if
attacked? What about our response to laser
dazzling or jamming during peacetime? Neither
case is acceptable, and what should the
consequences be?
What impacts would an attack have on
combatant commanders’ war plans and what
implications does it have for their future
capability needs?
What is our military’s response posture? Would
we seamlessly transition to redundant or
alternative capabilities? What decision-making
and C-2 mechanisms would we need in place
ahead of time?

•

What diplomatic options should we consider
and what role should our friends and allies play?
Do treaties work to hold actors accountable, or,
are there other international instruments we can
leverage?

I look forward to the protection strategy the
Department must deliver to Congress later in the
year. I expect our subcommittee to hold hearings
and additional briefings on this subject. Some of
these important policy questions and options can be
debated in the open; other discussions will be
classified.
I am concerned about the affordability of the
national security space portfolio. I support space
modernization programs. I think one of the most
exciting things our nation does is in space and I’m
proud to be associated with it. However, how do
we manage modernization with limited resources?
I have observed continued cost growth and
schedule delays with ongoing acquisition programs
and expect big bills for TSAT, GPS-III, Space
Radar, and other NRO systems. Can the D-O-D
and I-C execute all their space acquisition plans?
I am an advocate for increasing the space
topline, and was pleased to see the Air Force space
budget increase by roughly $500 million. Getting
this through Congress will be tough, however, as
budget pressures with Iraq and Afghanistan, force
reset, and military healthcare continue to rise.
Additionally, Congressional PAYGO restrictions
and a lack of appetite for increased taxes will also
limit the flexibility of Congress to authorize
increased budgets. I am afraid Congress will be
looking for bill payers, and I will continue to make
the case that space spending is already at the bare
minimum and cannot be reduced in the future
without consequences.
With concerns about vulnerabilities and
single-point failures, we must change the legacy
model of building a few large, expensive, complex
satellites. Demand for robust systems engineering

will continue as we continue to insist on more
tradespace reviews—what architecture,
requirements, and design tradeoffs can be made to
lower complexity and/or cost?
I am concerned about budget estimates, the
predictability of costs, limiting government
requirements growth, and contractor “add-ons.” I
like “Back-to-Basics” acquisition approach; it is
similar to my “First-Things-First” philosophy. I
believe the community has turned the corner, but
still has to prove it works.
Let me touch briefly on key space programs
and some other topics of importance to me.
I have supported Space Radar for many
years now. Last year, Congress received letters of
support for this program from warfighters and
intelligence chiefs. (Dr. Sega) However,
committees and members disagreed on the value
and technical solution for Space Radar.
I expect the debate to continue. Congress is
expecting a detailed, revised acquisition strategy
and an independent review of alternatives
TSAT. Both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees fully supported TSAT. I was,
therefore, disappointed with the $150 million cut by
the appropriators. I am equally disappointed by the
Department’s decision to cut $4 billion from the
program because so many other defense programs
are relying on TSAT, such as F-C-S. I dislike that
TSAT is penalized even though it has followed a
sound approach to maturing technology and
applying “Back-to-Basics.”
GPS. I was equally disappointed with the
$100 million GPS-3 cut. We need to move to GPS3 as quickly as possible. I support the incremental
block approach being taken by the program office
and am happy to see the Department moving
forward with this in their 2009 budget request.

Operationally Responsive Space. I was at
Kirtland when the Space Development and Test
Wing stood up. I see promise in O-R-S. It offers
potential surge, reconstitution, and niche
capabilities. I am aware there has been debate
within the community on the focus of O-R-S. Our
intent, codified in 2007 legislation, is a focus on
getting simple, low cost solutions rapidly on-orbit to
meet the needs of our combatant commanders. A
secondary benefit is that it provides more frequent
opportunities to prove-out innovative concepts and
technologies at a lower cost.
On the subject of black-white space
integration, last October I sent a letter to Secretary
Gates asking him to re-establish the dual-hatted
undersecretary position. I thought Pete Teets did a
good job in this role. I don’t understand why one
person cannot provide oversight and leadership
across national security space. The Secretary of
Defense has the entire defense portfolio under him.
I know opinions in Congress vary. I believe
one person setting policy and making decisions in
the context of an integrated architecture is
beneficial and reduces unnecessary overlaps,
especially in planning and acquisition.
I also want to touch briefly on missile
defense and space. Since the Bush Administration
withdrew from the A-B-M treaty, we have seen
great progress in fielding a ballistic missile defense
system in a short period of time. As we look
forward, I believe space will play a greater role
beyond missile warning capabilities like SBIRS.
I would like to revisit space-based
interceptors. While I support and prefer passive and
reversible methods for protection, I cannot discount
the potential utility of defensive space-based
interceptors. Why space-based interceptors? The
orbital debris is entirely undesirable. However,
against an incoming ballistic missile, orbital debris
versus destruction of New York City is an easy
trade for me to make. I believe we need to at least
look at it by looking at the technology, costs,

benefits, and policy implications to better inform
future decisions.
Lastly, I want to touch on an area that is
important to me—professional development and
science and math education. I spoke with Buzz
Aldrin last year and we had a long conversation on
this topic.
I am interested in ideas on how to strengthen
youth science and math education, and recruit more
young folks into aerospace careers. I think
professional development is equally important and I
was pleased that my legislation on space cadre
management was included in the final 2007 defense
bill.
It has been an honor to speak here today. As
I mentioned earlier, I think space and in particular,
national security space, is one of the most exciting
things our nation does. We have challenging space
policy and program issues ahead of us and
collectively, we have an opportunity to tee up these
issues for the next Administration. I look forward
to your thoughts and suggestions and I hope you
will share these with Congress as well as the next
Administration.
We just celebrated the 50th anniversary of
the first satellite launch. It took a unique cadre of
talented and driven individuals to accomplish what
our nation did in its first 50 years in space. It will
take no less talented and driven of a cadre to shape
the next 50 years. I am proud to be associated with
these endeavors and with the people who make
them happen.
Thank you.
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As many of you probably know, my Congressional
district in Southern California is home to the Space
and Missile Command – the arm of the Air Force
tasked with developing and procuring the space assets
that give America its eyes and ears in space.
It’s also the best Congressional district in the country.
We are the place for sun, surf, and satellites – the only
place in America where aerospace engineers have
tans!
Thousands of these engineers are my constituents.
And over the years, I have gained a deep and abiding
respect for both the importance and difficulty of what
they do.
We ask them to construct an amalgam of circuits,
wiring, sensors, and fragile structures that must
survive unimaginable rigors of launch and harsh
conditions of outer space, with scant possibility of
repair, and perform flawlessly for years. And we
place the technical responsibility for carrying out core
functions of the government – from communications
to intelligence to operations – in their hands.
There is very little margin for error.
Given those stakes, SMC and the industry it helps
lead have amassed an impressive record in recent
years. We haven’t had a launch failure nearly a
decade, 56 in a row and counting. General Mike
Hamel at SMC deserves a lot of credit for this
success.

But we shouldn’t spend too much time patting
ourselves on the back. We have some big challenges
ahead of us.
You’ve just heard from my colleague Terry Everett
about the budget the President released this week.
Terry and I have worked closely together on the
Intelligence Committee and the Space Power Caucus.
I want to keep my remarks today focused on the big
picture. My thesis is that the Administration and
Congress have been snoozing. Seven years after the
Rumsfeld Commission Report, which highlighted our
critical dependence on space, and more than one year
after the Chinese ASAT test, we have no strategy.
Although China knew the orbit of its satellite, the
ASAT test nonetheless amply demonstrated its
capability in space.
The ASAT test put the spotlight on our Achilles heel.
Our space assets, particularly those in low earth orbit
(or LEO), are vulnerable.
The test also increased the amount of space debris
orbiting the Earth by about 20 percent, potentially
threatening satellites in LEO for decades, if not
longer.
The tacticians will focus on China – spinning out
scenarios for ASAT attacks during a conflict in the
Straits of Taiwan. Those scenarios are certainly
worthy of our careful study.
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But this isn’t a China-specific problem. The media
has reported that Russia has had ASAT abilities for
years. Other nations also have demonstrated the
ability to disrupt or degrade our use of space assets.
And it will not be too difficult for these nations to
develop more effective ASAT capabilities in the
coming decades.

out. And the new President may have a different
vision.

The problem is not a short-term hiccup in an
otherwise solid plan. It is a long-term strategic
vulnerability that needs to be addressed now. China’s
test was a very urgent wake-up call.

As policy makers, we in Congress don’t have the
luxury of just throwing stones – though we often
forget this. We have to offer constructive
suggestions.

But we pushed the snooze button. In the year-plus
since the test – and about a year since Sen. Kyl and I
discussed this topic at CSIS – the United States
government has done almost nothing in response.

Here are mine.

I would have expected an Administration that warned
of a “space Pearl Harbor” in the 2000 elections to
have made a greater effort to protect us against the
threat.
To be fair, none of the major candidates for President
has addressed such the threat either.
Our space acquisition budget reflects this lack of a
strategy. We behave like kids in a candy store.
The Administration pursues “desirements” –
technologies that would be great to have but are not
of the utmost importance. Not coincidentally, some
of these projects are staggeringly expensive and entail
enormous risk.

But we can surely agree that one key policy goal be to
maintain our leadership in space for decades to come.
And to do that, we must be able to counter the threat
posed by ASAT technologies.

In my opinion, any comprehensive strategy to
preserve our leadership position in space must include
five elements: intelligence, defensive measures,
redundancy, risk mitigation, and export control
reform.
First, we need to understand the motivations of
adversaries. Why did China conduct the ASAT test?
Was China attempting to send the United States a
message? Is it announcing its intent to become a
global strategic rival? Or, as many believe, is its
focus primarily regional?
The same questions can be asked of Russia and other
nations. What are their capabilities and intentions in
space and how do they impact our interests?

Recent procurement and operational failures should
come as no surprise.

Those answers are relevant to our strategy. If China
is primarily interested in intimidating Taiwan, we
have some time to adjust to their newly unveiled
capabilities. If, however, they intend to develop
space capabilities to rival ours, time may be short.

Our new President – whoever she or he may be –
should come into office with a strategy in hand. But
we need not wait for a new Administration. The
sooner we start this process the better.

Intelligence is a priority. Congress may want to
consider asking for a National Intelligence Estimate
on the test and potential threats to our position in
space.

The Administration’s 2006 policy statement sets
general goals, not a strategic vision. It needs fleshing

We should also talk to the Chinese, in much the same
way that we spoke to the Soviets during the Cold
War.

I was heartened to hear Defense Secretary Gates
speak about enhancing military-to-military contacts
with China. These sorts of exchanges can not only
help us better understand China’s motivations, they
can help avoid the misunderstandings that can lead to
a more confrontational relationship.
Gates’ model is the strategic dialogue between the US
and the Soviets during the Cold War, which was key
to preventing miscalculations.
Second, we should employ defensive measures in
space, and harden our ground assets.

Securing those facilities must therefore be a top
priority.
But we are unlikely to stop every attack or
sufficiently protect every space asset. To protect core
capabilities, we must build redundancy into our
overhead architecture – my third suggestion.
We should have multiple assets available to do the
same job. That is already the case with certain
programs, like GPS. We can afford to lose a few GPS
satellites without losing much capability.
LEO satellites (like China’s weather satellite) are
particularly vulnerable.

I can’t discuss the specifics, but it is widely known
that we have the technology to protect key assets
against certain kinds of non-physical attacks –
particularly attacks that use electro-magnetic pulses
(or EMPs).

Using higher orbits – particularly geosynchronous (or
GEO) orbits – for more assets that we currently keep
in LEO can help protect our capabilities.

We need to think “out of the box” to find other means
to protect our satellites from attacks.

Not all of these redundant assets needs to be in space.
We can keep some of the satellites on the ground if
we have the capability to get them into space quickly
and at a reasonable cost.

We should incorporate this technology not only into
all new military and intelligence satellites, but in
some commercial satellites as well.
But we shouldn’t expect miracles. These
technologies can’t harden a satellite against kinetic
kill vehicles, like the missile China used in its test.
We also can’t retrofit assets that are already in space.
We sometimes forget that our space assets are only
part of the equation. We depend on ground
infrastructure to make those assets work.
That infrastructure is vulnerable to all kinds of
physical attacks like car bombs, electro-magnetic
attacks, or (like much of our government’s
information technology backbone) cyber attacks.
If the United States is ever in a war with our space
assets under attack, you can count on attacks on our
ground-based space infrastructure as well.

This, of course, is the idea behind operationally
responsive space (or, ORS). We have begun to invest
serious time and money in ORS, and there are some
brilliant rocket scientists working in this area. And
yes, some of them are constituents!
The potential of ORS is not yet fully realized, as even
its biggest proponents will admit. But that potential
can be reached if we sustain our commitment and our
funding.
Redundancy will not be enough, however. There are
only so many satellites that the US can afford. We
must therefore mitigate our risk by enhancing our
cooperation with civilian imaging and
communications assets, and those of our allies – the
fourth element of my strategy.
The capabilities of commercial imaging and
communications satellites have grown by leaps and

bounds in recent years. They can serve many of our
military needs.

A more balanced – and I believe, more targeted –
export regime is essential.

Of course, we already make extensive use of civilian
and ally assets. During the Iraq war, for example, the
US military used 2.4 gigabits of bandwidth per
second – and over half of that communications
capacity came from commercial sources.

I’m not ruling out the possibility of some form of
multilateral or bilateral agreements, perhaps to
preclude the debris-causing sort of test that China
conducted last year.

But there is room to grow, particularly in the use of
commercial imaging products.

An informal code of conduct that sets norms of
behavior for space-faring nations could be
particularly helpful in restraining reckless behavior
like last year’s test.

We should consider relaxing current restrictions on
resolution. Many civilian imaging satellites can
achieve amazing clarity, and with a few changes can
provide imagery close to what our military planners
are used to seeing.

History has shown that multilateral diplomatic
pressure – peer pressure, if you will – can be very
effective in setting norms for space.

Enhanced cooperation would have the added benefit
of supporting our space industrial base. The more we
use these private companies, the more we enable them
to grow, developing the industrial base and
developing capabilities that the US government can
use.
We will also help provide employment for more
aerospace engineers. As I have said many times,
rocket scientists do not grow on trees.
Fifth and finally, we should fundamentally reexamine
our approach to export controls.

But we should be realistic about what formal
agreements can achieve. Identifying which programs
are covered is a challenge, and it could be almost
impossible to verify compliance.
We should also mind our words. Using needlessly
provocative language is foolish. Our current space
capabilities are no match for any other nation, even
given China’s test.
Given that advantage, we would have much to lose in
a space arms race, in which other nations have the
excuse to invest in offensive capabilities that go far
beyond kinetic kills in LEO.

Restrictions on the space technologies companies can
export have had the perverse effect of encouraging
other nations – like China and India – to develop their
own indigenous technologies.

***

Rather than buying or renting technology built by
American companies that are subject to American
law, we have given these countries the incentive to
figure it out on their own.

It’s time to wake up, get focused, and implement a
comprehensive strategy to protect our position in
space.

These five suggestions could form the core of a space
strategy.

We snooze at our peril.
These nations have gained their own strategically
important industries, denying us a lock on cuttingedge technologies.

